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“There can be no doubt that despite their titles, ‘United States’ Attorneys undoubtedly make
charging and other decisions based on what they see as the needs and values of the communities in
which they work. It is therefore not surprising that state-by-state disparities in the administration
of federal death sentences correlate with the frequency with which U.S. Attorneys request Main
Justice’s approval to seek death sentences. And, arguably, this is not just acceptable, but rather is
fundamental if we are to survive as a united federalism in a nation whose values differ
profoundly from one part to another.”
1
—Judge Guido Calabresi
“Implicit in the dissent’s discussion of this point is an unwarranted factual assumption: that a
local United States Attorney’s view regarding the appropriate sentence for a crime mirrors the
values of the community in which he serves. This is hardly obvious given that United States
Attorneys are not elected to their positions but are appointed by the President of the United States,
who himself may or may not2 have received a majority of the votes cast in the district at issue.”
—Judge Reena Raggi

I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2000, the Department of Justice released a comprehensive statistical survey that examined the Department’s process for
3
seeking the federal death penalty. Troubled by allegations of racial
and regional disparity in the application of the federal death penalty,
President Bill Clinton commissioned the study a few months before
Juan Raul Garza was scheduled to be the first prisoner executed by
*
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United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 287–88 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc) (citation omitted).
Id. at 279 (Raggi, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY
(1988–2000) (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc /dpsurvey.html.
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the federal government in more than thirty-seven years. Analyzing
the period from November 1988 through July 2000, the survey
tracked the number of recommendations and authorizations to seek
the death penalty by judicial district, race of the victim, and race of
5
the defendant. Though some who read the report differed in their
6
interpretations of the data regarding race, no one could dispute that
the study indicated the existence of clear geographic disparities,
demonstrated most notably by the fact that only five of all ninety-four
federal districts were responsible for submitting more than 42% of all
the cases reviewed by the Department of Justice for capital prosecu7
tion.
The Justice Department’s study weighed in at 422 pages, analyzing
decisions made with regard to 682 defendants and parsing the data
8
into eighty-six different tables. In June 2001, a supplementary report
9
was released that examined a larger pool of 973 defendants. The re4

5
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8
9

See President Bill Clinton, Press Conference (June 28, 2000), available at
http://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/New/html/conference2000-06-28.html (“The issues at the
federal level relate more to the disturbing racial composition of those who have been
convicted and the apparent fact that almost all the convictions are coming out of just a
handful of states, which raises the question of whether, even though there is a uniform
law across the country, what your prosecution is may turn solely on where you committed
the crime. I’ve got a review underway of both those issues at this time.”); Press Release,
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Date Set for First Federal Execution Since 1963 (May 26, 2000),
available at http://www.bop.gov/news/press/press_releases/ipapr003.jsp. As the result
of a short-lived stay of execution, Garza was not the first federal prisoner to be executed;
Timothy McVeigh, the Gulf War veteran responsible for the 1995 bombing of the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City that claimed the lives of 168 people, was executed
first. See Alex Rodriguez, U.S. Executes McVeigh: Oklahoma City Bomber is 1st Federal Inmate
Put to Death Since ’63, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 2001, at 1.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-14–T-17.
Compare Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Const., Federalism, and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold) (“[T]here are now 19 individuals
on Federal death row; 17 of them are racial or ethnic minorities. That is an extraordinary
number.”) [hereinafter Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System]
with id. at 8 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (“[T]he studies . . . show that there is no
invidious racial discrimination in the application of the Federal death penalty. Indeed, if
anything, these studies show that the Federal Government has sought the death penalty
for proportionately fewer minorities than whites.”).
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-15–T-17; see also Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System, supra note 6, at 15 (statement of Larry Thompson,
Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States) (noting that the Eastern District of Virginia, the
District of Puerto Rico, the District of Maryland, the Eastern District of New York, and the
Southern District of New York were “the districts which generated the largest numbers of
capital offense charges, accounting collectively for about half of the cases submitted to
the Department’s review procedure”).
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA,
ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW (2001), available at
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lease of those two reports generated a flurry of attention both in aca10
demic circles and among the news reports of the mainstream media.
Since then, much ink has been devoted to scrutinizing the federal
death penalty.
Prison population figures recently published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics suggest that out of the more than 2.3 million people in11
carcerated in the United States, about 3,297 of them (0.1%) are
12
awaiting execution. Of those 3,297, only fifty-five (1.7%) are on
13
federal death row. Equally remarkable is the tiny number of federal
executions compared to “stateside” executions. Since 1977, 1,173
14
people have been executed in the United States. Of those individu15
als, only three (0.3%) were federal convicts. Since the creation of
the American republic more than two centuries ago, the federal gov16
ernment has executed 340 people, whereas the State of Texas has
17
executed more than that many in the past fifteen years. As one
commentator has noted, “the score of prisoners on federal death row
18
are in some respects little more than a footnote.”

10

11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18

http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm. In addition to the 682 cases
in the 2000 report, the Supplemental Report examined 60 cases that had gone or were
going through the review process or involved fugitives, and 231 cases that (1) should have
been, but were not, submitted to the capital case review procedure; (2) were exempted
from submission because the defendant pled to a noncapital offense; or (3) could have
been brought as death-eligible cases but were not.
It is not coincidental that these reports were published and so much attention directed to
the federal death penalty around the same time that the United States was preparing for
the first federal execution in nearly four decades. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT
MIDYEAR 2008—STATISTICAL TABLES 16 (2009), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/pim08st.pdf (stating that custody count excludes inmates held in U.S. Territories,
military facilities, immigration facilities, jails in Indian country, and juvenile facilities).
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2009),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf.
Death
Penalty
Information
Center,
Federal
Death
Row
Prisoners,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners (last visited Oct. 3, 2009)
(listing fifty-eight federal death row inmates including John Wayne Johnson, a convicted
murderer who will be sentenced in February 2010, David Runyon, a convicted murderer
who will be sentenced in December 2009, and David Paul Hammer, a long-time death
row inmate whose death sentence was vacated in United States v. Hammer, 404 F. Supp. 2d
676 (M.D. Pa. 2005), appeal dismissed 564 F.3d 628 (3d Cir. 2009)).
Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Database of Executions,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FEDERAL EXECUTIONS 1927–2003, http://www. deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php? scid=29&did=149.
John Brigham, Unusual Punishment: The Federal Death Penalty in the United States, 16 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 195, 209 (2004).
Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 14.
Brigham, supra note 16, at 212.
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Given the comparatively small number of individuals subject to
the federal death penalty, some scholars have thought it necessary to
defend the institution as a worthy candidate for study. We share the
opinion of Rory K. Little, a law professor who served as Associate
Deputy Attorney General and a member of the Justice Department’s
Capital Case Review Committee, that the “unique federalist nature of
the American system” arouses particular intrigue in the context of
19
application of the death penalty. Professor Little predicted that the
Federal Government’s shift in 2000 from “merely not preventing
some of the subsidiary states from [executing offenders]” toward selfimplemented executions at the national level would have symbolic
20
significance for the United States at home and abroad. It is not
clear that international critics of capital punishment have noticed the
21
change. However, American observers have noted that the recent
rise in federal death penalty prosecutions, federal death sentences,
and federal executions evokes serious and interesting questions of
22
federalism, uniformity, states’ rights, and community values.
Understanding American federalism at its most basic level requires familiarity with the hierarchy of national and local power established by the Framers. Article VI of the United States Constitution
declares that federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land” and super23
sedes conflicting state and local laws. Accordingly, Congress may
“authorize its own lawful punishments for criminal conduct within its
24
jurisdictional reach, regardless of state or local objections.” As the
Supreme Court has held, “[i]f [a] statute be a valid exercise of [fed-

19
20
21
22

23

24

Rory K. Little, The Future of the Federal Death Penalty, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 529, 537 (2000).
Id.
See, e.g., Roger Hood, Capital Punishment: A Global Perspective, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 331
(2001).
See, e.g., United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“For a federalism like ours—made up as it is of
states whose populations hold widely different moral viewpoints—to work, perhaps even
to survive, it is at least arguable that the values of the citizens of the state in question—not
just a minority of them—be reflected in trial juries, even in federal cases.”); Rory K. Little,
The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 357 (1999) (“Significant federalism and state sovereignty issues
lurk beneath the surface of a nationally uniform federal death penalty.”).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
Rory K. Little, Good Enough for Government Work?: The Tension Between Uniformity and Differing Regional Values in Administering the Federal Death Penalty, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 7, 8
(2001).
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eral] power, how it may affect persons or states is not material to be
considered. It is the supreme law of the land and persons and states
25
are subject to it.” However, two of the most acclaimed values of federalism are that it enhances democratic rule by providing government that is closer to the people and that it protects the autonomy of
one State to chart for itself a different course than that chosen by its
26
sister States. Those two values are inherently entwined, and both
suggest that uniformity may not be a desired consequence of federalism. As Justice Brandeis wrote, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic ex27
periments without risk to the rest of the country.”
With regard to capital punishment, Michigan was that “single courageous State” when, in 1846, it became the first English-speaking ju28
risdiction in the world to abolish the death penalty. Michigan was
29
followed by Rhode Island in 1852 and then by Wisconsin in 1853.
The trend towards abolition continued slowly and was most recently
manifested in New Mexico’s decision to repeal its death penalty stat30
ute earlier this year. In the United States today, fifteen states and
the District of Columbia have abolished the death penalty, whereas
the remaining thirty-five States, the federal government, and the mili31
tary have retained it.
Criticizing the traditional understanding of federalism’s benefits,
one scholar has suggested that “the greatest beauty of federalism is its
redundancy: multiple levels of government over the same territory
32
and population, each with the ability to act.” This argument finds
relief in that, if the federal government fails to act, appropriate action
by the state and local governments remains possible (and vice versa).

25
26

27
28
29
30
31
32

Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 525 (1995); see also
United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990) (“One of the by-products of our
nation’s federal system is the doctrine of ‘dual sovereignty’ . . . . This doctrine rests upon
the basic structure of our polity. The states and the national government are distinct political communities, drawing their separate sovereign power from different sources, each
from the organic law that established it. Each has the power, inherent in any sovereign,
independently to determine what shall be an offense against its authority and to punish
such offenses.”).
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases,
40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 76 (1987).
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 134 (2002).
Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A16.
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 12, at 1.
Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 538.
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In that vein, proponents of capital punishment contend that it is not
merely acceptable, but desirable, for the federal government to seek
33
the death penalty in States that do not have it. Others, however, including some death penalty opponents, contend that the federal government should not be able to perform “an end-run” around state
34
laws prohibiting capital punishment.
The federal government’s pursuit of the death penalty in nondeath penalty states is a very recent phenomenon. Nine years ago,
each of the twenty-one defendants then on federal death row had
35
been convicted in states where the death penalty was available. Each
defendant had been convicted of an offense prohibited by both state
36
law and federal law and punishable by death in either jurisdiction.
Indeed, “not only could the conduct at issue in each case have been
prosecuted under existing state statutes, but the same penalty could
37
have been obtained.” However, given the Department of Justice’s
expansion of the death penalty into non-death penalty states, that is
no longer true. On March 16, 2002, Marvin Gabrion became the first
person sentenced to death in a non-death penalty state under the
federal system since the federal death penalty was reintroduced twen38
ty-one years ago. Since then, eight other defendants from six other
39
non-death penalty states have been condemned to death.
It should be noted that the federal government’s incursion into
the arena of criminal law raises serious states’ rights questions regardless of whether the death penalty is at issue. The enforcement of

33

34
35
36

37
38

39

See Anthony M. DeStefano, 2003 Slaying of Undercover Cops; Charges Keep Death Penalty in
Play, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 23, 2004, at A17 (describing how the district attorney transferred prosecution to federal government so that federal death penalty could be sought
after state courts ruled that New York’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional); Ed
White, Death Penalty Case Is a First; The Father of a Woman Whose Body Was Found in a National Forest Lake Praises the Federal Government’s Pursuit of Capital Punishment, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Feb. 27, 2001, at A1 (giving an example of the death penalty sought in federal
court in Michigan).
Corey Dade, Execution Foes Spin Sampson Verdict; Critics Say Case Doesn’t Reflect State Opinion,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 2003, at B1.
Little, supra note 19, at 542–44.
Id.; see also id. at 541–42 (“Virtually every federal offense for which death is an available
penalty is duplicative of some common state criminal offense. Murder is, of course, a
crime in every American jurisdiction . . . .”).
Id. at 542.
Ed White, Gabrion’s Lawyer: Sentence Not Justifiable; Rachel Timmerman’s Family, However, Is
Relieved After the Jury Decides Her Killer Should Die, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 17, 2002, at
A1.
FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES RESULTING IN A SENTENCE OF
DEATH 6–14, http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/6-2-08%20Death%20Row.pdf.
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criminal law has traditionally been an area of state concern. As the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, the “States possess primary au41
thority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.” The creation
of federal crimes and federal penalties has been “opposed and la42
mented as unwarranted intrusions into the states’ domain.” However, the federal government has become increasingly involved in
criminal justice; federal criminal law now reaches
virtually all robberies, most schemes to defraud, many firearms offenses,
all loan sharking, most illegal gambling operations, most briberies, . . . every drug deal, no matter how small . . . . anti-abortion violence,
carjacking, failure to pay child support, . . . ‘animal rights terrorism.’ . . . domestic violence, providing material support to terrorists, telemarketing fraud, interstate computer hacking, misuse of credit cards
and ATM cards, possession of handguns by juveniles, art theft, and ob43
structing a lawful hunt.

Though the federalization of crime implicates a myriad of issues that
deserve thoughtful examination quite apart from how it relates to
44
capital punishment, the aim of this Article is decidedly narrower.
Our main focus here is to explore how, under the direction of
former Attorneys General John Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzales, and Michael Mukasey, the Department of Justice pursued capital prosecutions in jurisdictions that had abolished or not provided for the death
45
penalty. The Department’s position was that it pursued such cases

40

41
42
43
44

45

See Sean M. Morton, Comment, Death Isn’t Welcome Here: Evaluating the Federal Death Penalty in the Context of a State Constitutional Objection to Capital Punishment, 64 ALB. L. REV.
1435, 1445 (2001).
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982).
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of
Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1095 (1995).
Id. at 1095–97 (footnotes omitted).
Other commentators have addressed some of these matters. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey,
Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135
(1995); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 643 (1997); Barbara S. Jones et al., Panel Discussion: The Prosecutor’s Role in Light of
Expanding Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657 (1999); Charles D. Bonner, Comment, The Federalization of Crime: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
905 (1998).
We refer to these fifteen states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico collectively as
“non-death penalty states,” but their respective paths to abolition are different. Four of
these states (Michigan, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Maine) abolished the death penalty
statutorily in the nineteenth century. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES 9 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). Minnesota and North Dakota did the
same in the early twentieth century. Id. Five states (Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Vermont, and
West Virginia) abolished the death penalty decades later in the 1950s and 1960s, and
Massachusetts abolished the death penalty in 1984. Id. Puerto Rico’s Constitution was ratified by Congress in 1952 and proclaims that “[t]he death penalty shall not exist.” P.R.
CONST. art. II, § 7. New Jersey repealed its death penalty in 2007, see Jeremy W. Peters,
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in order “to ensure consistency and fairness” in the application of the
46
federal death penalty. To be sure, the endeavor for a national standard is nothing new. Addressing the Second Annual Conference of
United States Attorneys in 1940, then-Attorney General Robert Jackson declared that “uniformity of policy” was “necessary to the prestige
47
of federal law” :
The federal government could not enforce one kind of law in one place
and another kind elsewhere. It could hardly adopt strict standards for
loose states or loose standards for strict states without doing violence to
local sentiment. . . . [T]he only long-term policy that will save federal justice from being discredited by entanglements with local politics is that it
confine itself to strict and impartial enforcement of federal law, letting
the chips fall in the community where they may. . . . [T]here should be
48
no permitting of local considerations to stop federal enforcement . . . .

Jackson’s remarks focused on the need for political consistency
and procedural centralization to cabin prosecutorial discretion, but
uniformity has remained a concern in other areas of criminal justice,
particularly sentencing. Judge Marvin Frankel inspired the creation
of the United States Sentencing Commission when he pronounced
that unguided discretion in sentencing had produced “a wasteland in
49
the law.” About a decade later, Congress responded by enacting the

46

47

48
49

Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes Sentences of 8, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007,
at B3, and New Mexico repealed its death penalty earlier this year. See supra note 30. The
death penalty remains on the books in New York where the Court of Appeals held it to be
unconstitutional. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004). In 2007, the Court
of Appeals upheld LaValle and ordered the last prisoner on New York’s death row to be
resentenced. See People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969 (N.Y. 2007). Accordingly, New York is
included in our count of non-death penalty states.
Two different Department of Justice spokeswomen invoked the “consistency and fairness”
defense more than a dozen times over the course of a year. See, e.g., Matt Burgard, 2 Suspects in Killing Could Face Execution: Prosecutors Pressured to Seek Death Penalty, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 7, 2003, at B7 (“‘A process exists . . . . to ensure consistency and fairness
in the application of the death penalty in all U.S. attorney districts across the country,’
Barbara Comstock, the department’s director of pubic affairs, said in a statement.”); William Glaberson, Unlikely Symbol in Death Debate: The Last Don; U.S. Is Weighing Charges
Against Old-Style Mafia Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at B1 (“Monica Goodling, a
spokeswoman for Mr. Ashcroft, . . . said the Justice Department’s ‘process for evaluating
death-eligible cases is designed to ensure consistency and fairness in the application of
the death penalty nationwide.’”).
Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen. of the United States, The Federal Prosecutor, Address at
the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 31 AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4 (1940).
Id. at 6.
Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1972); see John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S.
Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1702 n.17 (2003)
(“Judge Frankel’s call for a national sentencing commission was a driving force in the
creation of the United States Sentencing Commission . . . .”).
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50

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The law sought to avoid “unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
51
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.” The Act
not only established the Sentencing Commission, but it also directed
the Commission to promulgate guidelines that would be uniform in
52
application without regard to geography. Because the Act predates
53
the 1988 restoration of the federal death penalty, it does not address
death sentencing. However, “[n]othing in the more recent congressional death penalty legislation suggests that Congress has changed
its intention to have federal criminal punishment administered uniformly for similar violations and violators of identical federal stat54
utes.” Such silence is golden for the Department of Justice, which
has said that its “decisions are governed by a desire to see that the
55
federal death penalty is applied uniformly around the country.”
The pursuit of uniformity in the administration of the federal
death penalty is part of a larger centralization effort at the Department of Justice spearheaded by former Attorney General John Ashcroft. In 2003, then Attorney General Ashcroft circulated a directive
to all federal prosecutors requiring them to “charge and pursue the
most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported
56
by the facts of the case.” Under Attorney General Janet Reno and
before the issuance of the 2003 Ashcroft Memorandum, federal prosecutors were instructed to make an “individualized assessment of the
extent to which particular charges fit the specific circumstances of
the case” and to consider a number of factors, including the sentencing guideline range yielded by the charge, whether the range is proportional to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, and whether
the charge achieves the purposes of retribution, isolation, deterrence,

50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28
U.S.C.).
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006).
Id. § 991.
See discussion infra Part III.
Little, supra note 22, at 536.
William Glaberson, Capital Cases and Agendas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003, at B1.
Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to All U.S. Att’ys 1
(Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT. R. 134 (2003), available at
http://txw.fd.org/pdf_lib/memoagcds.pdf [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum]. For a
more thorough discussion of the Ashcroft Memorandum’s effect on prosecutorial discretion, see HARRY I. SUBIN, BARRY BERKE, & ERIC TIRSCHWELL, THE PRACTICE OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE § 11.1(d) (2006).
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and rehabilitation.
However, the Ashcroft Memorandum eliminated the “discretion of federal prosecutors to inform their charging
58
decisions by consideration of [such] factors,” and made clear that
“[m]ajor decisions about prosecutorial priorities at the local and regional level [would] be dictated by the central command in Washing59
ton, not by local U.S. Attorneys.” Other commentators have similarly linked the Ashcroft Memorandum to the Department of Justice’s
pursuit of the federal death penalty, opining that “Ashcroft loves to
centralize power” and noting that the former Attorney General’s
“practice” was to “override the decisions of local U.S. Attorneys
60
whether to seek the death penalty in individual cases.”
In the form of an introduction, Part I of this Article outlined the
issue by giving a snapshot of the current federal death penalty climate
and by discussing the implications of federalism and the value of uniformity in sentencing. Part II of this Article will provide a brief history of the federal death penalty, starting with the enactment of first
capital federal statutes in 1790. Part III will discuss the Supreme
61
Court’s 1972 ruling in Furman v. Georgia, the post-Furman restoration
of the federal death penalty in 1988, and the dramatic expansion of
the federal death penalty in 1994. Part IV will compare the Department of Justice’s administration of the federal death penalty under
former Attorneys General Janet Reno, John Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzales, and Michael Mukasey. Part V will describe how communities in
non-death penalty states reacted to the federal government’s pursuit
of capital sentences in their respective jurisdictions and discuss how
the Department of Justice has overruled and replaced U.S. Attorneys
who were reluctant to extend the federal death penalty into nondeath penalty states. Finally, Part VI will explore the potential impact
of the appointment of Eric Holder as Attorney General on the administration of the federal death penalty in non-death penalty states.

57

58
59

60
61

Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to Holders of U.S. Att’ys’
Manual, Title 9 (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT. R. 352, 352 (1994) (describing
the “appropriate” items for consideration by “the attorney for the government”).
SUBIN ET AL., supra note 56, at § 11.1(d).
Edward Lazarus, Attorney General Ashcroft’s New Charging, Plea Bargaining, and Sentencing
Policies: Though Consideration Is Needed, Criticism Has Been Overstated, FINDLAW, Oct. 2,
2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20031002.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
Id.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the death penalty as then-administered ran afoul of the
Eighth Amendment’s protection against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments).
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
Whatever else may be said about capital punishment in the United
States, there is little uncertainty that the death penalty “is explicitly
62
contemplated in the Constitution.” The Fifth Amendment’s Grand
Jury Clause says that no person shall be held to answer for a capital
63
crime unless first indicted by a grand jury. The Double Jeopardy
Clause of the same Amendment states that no person shall be twice
64
“put in jeopardy of life” for the same offense. The Amendment’s
Due Process Clause expressly prohibits the Federal Government from
65
depriving a person of life without due process of law. Furthermore,
other parts of the Constitution imply the existence of the death penalty. For example, Article II gives the President the power to “Grant
66
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States.” The
pardon power broadly authorizes the President to grant clemency for
67
all sorts of criminal matters, but the reprieve power is understood as
relating specifically to the postponement of executions and commu68
tation of death sentences. To be sure, “parts of the Constitution indicate that those who drafted and ratified it contemplated the con69
tinued existence of the death penalty.”
Shortly after it convened in 1789, the First Congress provided that
all capital trials were to take place in “the county where the offence
70
was committed.”
However, Congress did not specify any capital
crimes until April 1790 when it enacted a mandatory death penalty
for treason, murder, piracy, forgery, and the rescue of a person con71
victed of a capital crime. Benefit of clergy, a common law mechanism by which a first-time offender could receive a more lenient sen72
73
tence, was denied to the condemned, and the statutorily prescribed

62

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 46 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (emphasis omitted).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
BANNER, supra note 29, at 234.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
BANNER, supra note 29, at 234.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88.
Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 3, 8–10, 14, 23, 1 Stat. 112–19 [hereinafter 1790 Crime
Bill].
See BANNER, supra note 29, at 62–64.
1790 Crime Bill, supra note 71, § 31.
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method of execution was “hanging the person convicted by the neck
74
until dead.”
In 1829, days before leaving office, President John Quincy Adams
transmitted to Congress a report on how the federal death penalty
75
had been employed from 1790 through 1826. The report revealed
that, in the federal death penalty’s first thirty-six years, 138 defen76
dants had been tried for capital offenses and 118 were convicted.
Of the forty-five defendants tried for capital murder, thirty-seven of
77
them (82%) were convicted. Twenty-four were executed (65%), six
were pardoned (16%), and each of the remaining seven either com78
mitted suicide, died, escaped, or was otherwise “unaccounted for.”
Congress published a similar report towards the end of the nineteenth century to examine how things had changed since the federal
death penalty’s earlier years. To support his legislation calling for
79
“the total abolition of the [federal] punishment of death,” Congressman Newton M. Curtis assembled the data that made its way into
the congressional report. In passing a bill to reduce the number of
capital crimes, the House Judiciary Committee did indeed rely on
Curtis’s report, which Congressman Simon Peter Wolverton hailed as
“probably the most thorough and exhaustive ever made” regarding
80
the federal death penalty. Curtis’s research revealed that of the 271
defendants indicted on federal murder charges from 1890 through
1892, sixty-three were convicted (23%), and only thirteen of those
81
sixty-three were executed (21%).
Going beyond the numbers
above, Curtis calculated that “[i]n former times in proper cases,
about 85 per cent of those tried [for capital crimes] were convicted,
while in recent years the average is less than 20 per cent in the Fed82
eral courts, and still lower in the State courts.”
The Curtis report and the conclusions drawn therefrom were influential in the ultimate success of a bill entitled “An Act To reduce
83
the cases in which the penalty of death may be inflicted,” which abolished the federal death penalty for all but five categories of crime:

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. § 33.
H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 20-146 (1829).
H.R. REP. NO. 54-108, at 4–5 (1896) (analyzing data from the 1829 report on federal
death penalty).
Id. at 5.
Id.
See Little, supra note 22, at 367 & n.93 (alteration in the original).
H.R. REP. NO. 53-545, at 2 (1894).
H.R. REP. NO. 54-108, at 5 (1896).
Id. at 3.
Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, §§ 1–5, 29 Stat. 487.
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murder, rape, treason, crimes subject to Army justice, and crimes sub84
ject to Navy justice. Additionally, the new law made the death pen85
alty discretionary, rather than mandatory. In upholding that 1897
law, the Supreme Court explained that providing for a discretionary
death penalty was a prudent consideration of “the reluctance of ju86
rors to concur in a capital conviction.” Forced to condemn to death
defendants found guilty of any capital offense, juries had engaged in
a striking pattern of nullification, as demonstrated by the statistics
87
calculated by Curtis. Some legislatures responded by decreeing that
only certain degrees of murder could be punished by death, whereas
other legislatures, such as Congress, allowed juries to “qualify their
88
verdict[s] by adding thereto ‘without capital punishment.’”
With the number of civilian capital offenses reduced from sixty to
89
three, and with federal juries empowered to sentence defendants to
life imprisonment instead of death, it is unsurprising that federal executions in the twentieth century were rare. From 1900 through
1963, when the last federal execution of the twentieth century was
90
carried out, only thirty-nine individuals were put to death as a result
91
of a federal conviction.
Throughout the twentieth century, only
92
eight death penalty states executed fewer defendants, and five states
93
that are currently non-death penalty states executed more. Though
five of the thirty-nine twentieth century federal executions were car-

84
85
86
87

88
89

90
91
92

93

Id. §§ 2–3.
Id. § 1.
Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 310 (1899).
See Philip English Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note,
54 B.U. L. REV. 32, 32 (1974) (evaluating the claim that the mandatory death penalty in
the mid-nineteenth century “made securing convictions more difficult and often resulted
in the acquittal of obviously guilty defendants”).
Winston, 172 U.S. at 310–12.
See H.R. REP. NO. 53-545, at 1 (1894) (introduction to House report accompanying an
earlier version of the capital crimes reduction legislation, noting that “[a]t this time there
are sixty offenses for which Federal laws prescribe the death penalty, positively or conditionally”).
Little, supra note 22, at 355–57.
Federal, Territorial and Indian Tribunal List, http://users.bestweb.net/~rg/execution/
DATA%20FEDERAL.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
Id. The nine death penalty states to have executed fewer than thirty-nine people in the
twentieth century are Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota,
Utah, and Wyoming.
Id. The five non-death penalty states to have executed more people in the twentieth century than the federal government had executed over the same period are New York (641
executions), New Jersey (187 executions), West Virginia (91 executions), Massachusetts
(65 executions), and Hawaii (42 executions). All of Hawaii’s executions were carried out
before it obtained statehood in 1950, and all of the other executions were performed before the pre-Furman death penalty moratorium began in 1967.
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ried out in three states that do not authorize capital punishment today (Iowa, Michigan, and New York), Michigan was the only state of
the three that was a non-death penalty jurisdiction at the time of the
94
federal execution. It is useful to briefly examine that episode because the anger and confusion that was produced by the prospect of a
federal execution in a non-death penalty state is the same engendered today under similar circumstances.
On July 8, 1938, Anthony Chebatoris was executed at the federal
detention farm in Milan, Michigan for a bank robbery in which a by95
stander was killed. Nearly a century prior, Michigan had abolished
96
its death penalty statutorily, and it had never seen an execution in
97
all of its time as a state. Then, as now, the people of Michigan were
strongly opposed to capital punishment and—just seven years before
Chebatoris’s execution—had soundly defeated a statewide referen98
dum calling for the restoration of the death penalty. Perhaps the
most abolitionist of any state, Michigan is the only state in the Union
99
to prohibit capital punishment in its state constitution. Of over sixty
legislative attempts and four petition drives to revive capital punish100
ment in Michigan, none has proven successful.
When the federal government brought a capital charge against
Chebatoris, many Michiganders made their objections known, including the widow of Chebatoris’s victim and the victim’s sister-in-law who
claimed that her dying brother-in-law told her that he wanted Cheba101
toris to be spared in the event of his death. Nonetheless, the prosecution proceeded, and a federal jury found Chebatoris guilty and
102
sentenced him to death after less than a day of deliberation. Trou-

94

95
96
97
98

99
100
101
102

See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 15. Anthony Chebatoris was executed in Michigan in 1938 although Michigan had abolished the death penalty in 1846. See supra note
28 and accompanying text. The Rosenbergs and Gerhard Puff were electrocuted in New
York in 1953 and 1954, respectively, but New York was a death penalty state from its inception until the Supreme Court’s 1972 Furman decision and then again from 1995 until
the New York Court of Appeals’ 2004 LaValle decision. See supra note 45. Victor Feguer
was executed in Iowa in 1963, but Iowa did not abolish the death penalty until 1965. Id.
Aaron J. Veselenak, The Execution of Anthony Chebatoris, MICH. HIST., May/June 1998, at 35.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
Veselenak, supra note 95 (noting that, before Chebatoris’s, the last execution in Michigan
was in 1830—more than six years before Michigan entered the Union).
Eugene G. Wanger, Historical Reflections on Michigan’s Abolition of the Death Penalty, 13 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 755, 769 n.86 (1996) (noting that the popular vote was 269,538 for the
death penalty and 352,594 against it—a difference of fourteen percentage points).
See MICH. CONST. art IV, § 46.
Scott Davis & Jack Tucker, Michigan History Reveals Similar Tale, SAGINAW NEWS (Mich.),
June 10, 2001, at 1A.
Veselenak, supra note 95.
Id.
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bled that federal law demanded that the execution take place in
Michigan, Governor Frank Murphy appealed to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to move the execution to another state, noting that there
had not been an execution in Michigan in more than 100 years and
suggesting that hanging Chebatoris in Michigan would be “like turn103
ing back the clock of civilization.” Roosevelt referred the matter to
the Attorney General who, in turn, asked U.S. District Judge Arthur J.
Tuttle to determine whether the execution could be moved. For
Judge Tuttle, the issues of federalism and supremacy discussed above
informed his decision to deny the Governor’s request:
I have neither the power nor the inclination to change the sentence. If I
did have the power to do so, I think it would be unfair to suggest that the
people of a neighboring state are less humane than are the people of our
own state of Michigan. This federal court is enforcing a federal law in
Michigan for an offense against the United States, committed in Michi104
gan.

Governor Murphy was less hesitant to impugn the humanity of
“the people of a neighboring state.” Outraged at Judge Tuttle’s decision, Murphy declared:
I deplore the fact that this execution is taking place within our state,
where for more than a century there hasn’t been a legal execution. It
has always seemed to me that Michigan could take pride in being the first
commonwealth on this earth to abolish capital punishment. I don’t
think it against the interests of the people of this state to oppose its revival by having the federal government come in here, erect a scaffold and
hang a man by the neck until he is dead. . . . I think the federal government should have arranged for the execution elsewhere—if it was to take
105
place anywhere.

Murphy then compared Illinois to a “neighbor [who] was in the habit
of chloroforming dogs in his backyard” and suggested that it would
be more appropriate for Chebatoris to be executed by such a neigh106
bor because “one more or less probably wouldn’t disturb him.”
It is significant that Murphy accepted the federal government’s
authority to try, convict, and punish Chebatoris; his objection was reserved for the venue of the execution. Today, federal law addresses
this matter by pronouncing that when a federal death sentence is to
be implemented, the execution should be done “in the manner prescribed by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed” unless that State “does not provide for implementation of a sentence of

103
104
105
106

Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
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death,” in which case the sentencing judge must designate a death
107
penalty state in which the execution is to be carried out. This provision makes clear that which both Judge Tuttle and Governor Murphy recognized: the federal government may enforce the federal
laws, including those laws that make certain federal offenses punishable by death, notwithstanding local opposition. At the same time,
insofar as it eliminates the possibility that a federal execution could
be carried out in a non-death penalty state, that law, 18 U.S.C. § 3596,
demonstrates Congress’s respectful recognition that certain communities may be opposed to capital punishment and avoids situations
similar to that of Chebatoris’s execution in an abolitionist state.
The Chebatoris episode is also significant for the purposes of this
paper because it demonstrates how federal officials may enforce unpopular capital statutes in order to service a particular political agenda. Chebatoris was prosecuted under the Federal Bank Robbery Act
108
of 1934, a relatively new federal law that was enacted in response to
nationwide requests for “Federal relief” from “organized gangsters”
who were considered “sufficiently powerful and well equipped to defy
109
local police.”
Though the local police had no trouble catching
Chebatoris—he was arrested by the county sheriff and held at the
county jail—the federal government made him the test case for the
110
Bank Robbery Act.
This can be better understood taking into account the fact that the U.S. Attorney who prosecuted Chebatoris was
a former congressman who had served on the committee that drafted
111
the Federal Bank Robbery Act of 1934, as well as the fact that,
though the Act explicitly granted states concurrent jurisdiction to
112
prosecute bank robbers in state court, the death penalty could be
obtained only in federal court.
In the twentieth century, Chebatoris was the only person executed
by the federal government in a non-death penalty state. Since Chebatoris’s hanging, no other federal inmate from a non-death penalty
state has been executed, however, seven of the fifty-five defendants
113
currently awaiting federal execution are from non-penalty states.
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

18 U.S.C. § 3596(a) (2006).
Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-235, 48 Stat. 783.
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1461, at 2 (1934).
Veselenak, supra note 95.
Id.
Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-235, § 4, 48 Stat. 783, 783.
See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 13; FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL,
supra note 39 (listing nine condemned inmates from non-death penalty states but failing
to account for the fact that a new trial was ordered earlier this year for defendants George
Lecco and Valerie Friend in United States v. Lecco, No. 2:05-00107, 2009 WL 1249287 (S.D.
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III. THE MODERN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY—POST-FURMAN / PREASHCROFT
A few months after the federal government executed Victor Fe114
guer in 1963, Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote an
opinion in which he questioned the constitutionality of the death
115
Taking a cue from Justice Goldberg’s opinion and in an
penalty.
116
effort to create “death row logjam,” the Legal Defense and Educational Fund of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) began to attack the constitutionality of the
death penalty in a series of lawsuits, eventfully halting all executions
117
in the United States by 1967. In 1972, the Supreme Court held in
Furman v. Georgia that the death penalty as then-administered violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, effec118
tively eliminating capital punishment nationwide. In particular, the
Supreme Court took issue with the “untrammeled discretion” pos119
sessed by juries “to let an accused live or insist that he die.”
Though the precise ramifications of the Furman decision on the
federal death penalty were debatable given that certain federal procedures were different than those spelled out in the Georgia statute
invalidated by the Supreme Court, insofar as a federal capital statute
granted juries unguided discretion to return death verdicts, Furman
120
was an insuperable barrier.
As Congress recognized in 1974, “the
practical effect of the Furman case is that the death penalty is not pre121
sently available for the enforcement of . . . Federal crimes.”
In an effort to address the problem outlined in Furman regarding
untrammeled discretion, Congress enacted an air piracy law two years
after the Supreme Court’s decision that indicated that the death penalty was to be mandatory if the jury found any one of a number of
122
statutorily-defined aggravating factors.
However, in 1976, the Su-

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

W. Va. May 4, 2009)). Coincidentally, the first of the nine federal defendants to be sentenced to death in a non-death penalty state was a Michigander, Marvin Gabrion.
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 15.
Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
Christopher Q. Cutler, Comment, Death Resurrected: The Reimplementation of the Federal
Death Penalty, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1189, 1195–96 (2000).
See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 45, at 184–85.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 247–48 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-885 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981.
See Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409; see also H.R. REP. NO. 93885 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981 (“The death penalty must be im-
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preme Court held that mandatory death sentencing schemes were no
123
less offensive to the Constitution than fully discretionary schemes.
The air piracy statute was therefore likely unconstitutional, but, because the federal government never prosecuted anyone under the
1974 version of the law, its validity was never tested in the courts. Similarly, when Congress sought to make the murder of a witness a capital offense in 1986 by cross-referencing it with the federal murder
statute that retained a pre-Furman, “open discretion” death penalty
procedure, that attempt also yielded a product of dubious legality
124
and one that also was never tested.
In 1988, in the midst of the so-called “War on Drugs,” Congress
added a death penalty provision to the continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”) statute and enacted detailed death penalty procedures
designed to respond directly to the Supreme Court’s constitutional
125
Congress’s attempt to craft a death penalty
rulings since Furman.

123

124
125

posed if any one of the aggravating factors set forth in the reported bill is found to exist
and none of the mitigating factors is found.”).
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that adoption of mandatory
death penalty does not eliminate constitutional deficiencies arising from unbridled jury
discretion in the imposition of capital punishment); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976) (same).
See Little, supra note 22, at 379.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181, 4387. The following table shows how the CCE statute addressed the Supreme Court’s death penalty
precedents:
Death Penalty
Section of CCE
Supreme Court
Procedure
Statute
Precedent
Gregg v. Georgia,
Bifurcated guilt/penalty proceedings
§ 848(i)(1)
428 U.S. 153 (1976)
Eligibility for death penalty limited
to offenders who intentionally kill or
cause an intentional killing

§ 848(n)(1)

Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987)

Eligibility for death penalty limited
to offenders against whom at least
one statutorily specified aggravating
factor is unanimously found

§ 848(j);
§ 848(n)(2)–
(12)

Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976)

Jury must consider mitigating factors
without limit to specified list

§ 848(j);
§ 848(m)

Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978)

Mitigating factors do not need to be
found unanimously

§ 848(k)

Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367 (1988)

Jury must be instructed that a death
sentence is never required

§ 848(k)

Woodson v. North Carolina,
7 428 U.S. 280 (1976)

Mentally insane offenders may not
be executed

§ 848(l)

Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986)

Offenders younger than 18 may not
be executed

§ 848(l)

Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988)
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statute that would meet constitutional muster was successful, and,
within three years, David Ronald Chandler became the first person
126
Since
sentenced to death in a federal court in nearly forty years.
then, the CCE statute and its death penalty procedures have with127
stood numerous constitutional challenges.
On September 13, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the Violent
128
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which contained
twenty-six death penalty-related sections that collectively made up the
129
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (“FDPA”). In addition to providing possible death penalties for more than a dozen preexisting fed130
eral offenses and nearly a dozen new federal offenses, FDPA
breathed new life into fifteen so-called “zombie statutes” that contained pre-Furman death penalty authorizations that were likely unconstitutional by prescribing new “constitutional procedures for the
131
imposition of the sentence of death.”
Though “the exact number
of federal offenses made death-eligible by [FDPA] is ‘open to interpretation’” because some provisions of the United States Code contain more than one death-eligible offense, there is no doubt that
“FDPA substantially increased the availability of the death penalty for
132
federal offenders.”

126
127
128
129
130
131

132

The citations to the United States Code in the table above correspond to the 1994 edition, thus they are no longer current. The special CCE death penalty procedures provisions were eliminated from the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 848 in 2006, see USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 221,
120 Stat. 192, 231 (2006), but they are detailed above to show at what lengths Congress
sought to resurrect the federal death penalty with a statute that could pass constitutional
muster.
See United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding Chandler’s
1991 conviction and the constitutionality of the CCE death penalty procedures).
See Little, supra note 22, at 384 n.205.
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
Id. §§ 60001–60026, 108 Stat. 1959–82.
See id. §§ 60005–60024; Little, supra note 22, at 389 n.232.
Id. § 60002. Among these procedures is the provision discussed above that authorizes
district courts to transfer the venue of a federal execution from a non-death penalty state
to a death penalty state. That provision makes clear Congress’s intent for the federal
criminal laws to be enforceable in all states—even if a defendant would need to be punished for violating those laws in a district other than the one in which he was convicted.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
Little, supra note 22, at 389–91 (quoting Charles Kenneth Eldred, Recent Developments, The
New Federal Death Penalties, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 293 n.2 (1994)). Additionally, in 1996,
Congress expanded the availability of the death penalty to four terrorism-related crimes.
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214. As of the printing of the 2000 Department of Justice statistical survey, see supra note
3 and accompanying text, there were nearly sixty capital crimes under federal law: Murder of officials enforcing laws relating to transportation, sale, and handling of certain an-
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The Federal Death Penalty Act was a Democratic initiative, intro133
FDPA,
duced by then-Senator, now-Vice President Joseph Biden.
and the omnibus crime bill of which it was a part, was designed to
dispel the belief that Democrats generally (and President Clinton

imals, 7 U.S.C. § 2146 (1994); Bringing in and harboring certain aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324
(1994); Murder of officials enforcing laws relating to the protection of horses, 15 U.S.C. §
1825 (1994); Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities, 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1994); Destruction of motor vehicles or motor vehicle facilities, 18 U.S.C. § 33 (1994); Drive-by shooting, 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994); Violence at international airports, 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1994); Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by a family member, 18
U.S.C. § 115 (1994); Chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. § 229A (Supp. IV 1998); Conspiracy
against rights, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994); Deprivation of rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1994); Federally protected activities, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994); Damage to religious
property; obstruction of the free exercise of religious rights, 18 U.S.C. § 247 (1994); Congressional, Cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1994); Gathering
or delivering defense information to aid foreign government, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1994); Explosive materials, 18 U.S.C. § 844 (1994); Firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1994); Possession of
firearms and dangerous weapons in Federal facilities, 18 U.S.C. § 930 (1994); Genocide,
18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994); Murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994); Protection of officers and employees of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994); Murder of foreign officials, official
guests, or internationally protected persons, 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994); Murder by a Federal prisoner, 18 U.S.C. § 1118 (1994); Foreign murder of United States nationals, 18
U.S.C. § 1119 (1994); Murder by escaped prisoners, 18 U.S.C. § 1120 (1994); Killing persons aiding Federal investigations or State correctional officers, 18 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994);
Kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994); Hostage taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994); Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994); Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant, 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1994); Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant, 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (1994); Injurious articles as nonmailable, 18
U.S.C. § 1716 (1994); Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, 18 U.S.C. § 1751
(1994); Use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, 18
U.S.C. § 1958 (1994); Violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1959
(1994); Wrecking trains, 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (1994); Bank robbery and incidental crimes, 18
U.S.C. § 2113 (1994); Motor vehicles (carjacking), 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994); Aggravated
sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994); Sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (1994); Sexual
abuse of a minor or ward, 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (1994); Abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2244 (1994); Sexual exploitation of children, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994); Violence against
maritime navigation, 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (1994); Violence against maritime fixed platforms,
18 U.S.C. § 2281 (1994); Homicide, 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1994); Use of weapons of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (1994); Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries,
18 U.S.C. § 2332b (Supp. II 1996); Use of chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. § 2332c (Supp. II
1996); Torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994); Treason, 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994); War crimes,
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. II 1996); Murder of officials enforcing laws relating to poultry inspection, 21 U.S.C. § 461 (1994); Murder of officials enforcing laws relating to meat inspection, 21 U.S.C. § 675 (1994); Continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994);
Murder of officials enforcing laws relating to inspection of egg products, 21 U.S.C. § 1041
(1994); Murder of nuclear inspectors, 42 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994); Aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C.
§ 46502 (1994).
133

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, S. 1607, 103d Cong. tit. II
(1993). Indeed, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, of which FDPA
was a part, was known popularly as the “Biden Crime Bill.” See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Press
Conference (Mar. 11, 2009) (“I wrote what used to be called the Biden Crime Bill back in
the ’90s . . . it had my name on it . . . .”).
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134

particularly) were soft on crime.
On the Senate Floor, Senator
John Kerry of Massachusetts boasted that the Democratic crime bill
was “overwhelmingly tougher” than past Republican efforts, noting
that the bill added “60 new death penalties . . . the largest expansion
135
of the Federal death penalty in the history of the U.S. Congress.”
Similarly, during his reelection campaign, President Clinton stated,
“[m]y 1994 crime bill expanded the death penalty for drug kingpins,
murderers of federal law enforcement officers, and nearly 60 addi136
tional categories of violent felons.” On August 25, 1994, all but two
137
Democratic senators voted in favor of the crime bill, clearing
FDPA’s path to the White House and breathing new life into the federal death penalty that had been dormant for more than three decades.
IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL
DEATH PENALTY
Shortly after the passage of FDPA and with more than fifty capital
offenses suddenly in the Department of Justice’s arsenal, Attorney
General Janet Reno took on the task of establishing internal Department procedures to govern the selection and prosecution of capital
cases. On January 27, 1995, Reno amended the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual to add a nine-part section regarding “Federal Prosecutions in
138
Which the Death Penalty May Be Sought.”
Collectively, these
139
amendments came to be known as the “Death Penalty Protocol.”
The Protocol made clear that, unlike most prosecutorial decisions,
the decision of whether to seek the death penalty was to be centralized in Washington, declaring that “[t]he death penalty shall not be
sought without the prior written authorization of the Attorney Gen134

135
136
137

138

139

See Eldred, supra note 132, at 294–96 (stating that Congress members did not clearly express their intent in passing the Act, but that they did “make broad arguments to the effect that it [was] self-evident that the death penalty [was] tough on crime”).
140 CONG. REC. 23,929, 23,961–62 (1994) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
On the Issues: Death Penalty, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 8, 1996, at 4A.
140 CONG. REC. 24,114, 24,114–15 (1994). The two Democratic senators to oppose the
crime bill were Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama, who joined the Republican Party two
months after the vote, see Alabama Senator Makes Switch to Republican Party, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 9, 1994, at A1, and Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin who felt “compelled” to vote against the bill “because of the absurd extension of the death penalty with
no real gain coming from it, and because of the greatly increased dangerous trend for federalization of law enforcement.” 140 CONG. REC. 23,802 (1994).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-10.000 (1995), available at
http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/contents/shared_files/docs/01a_doj_manual.htm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter 1995 DOJ Protocol].
Little, supra note 22, at 407.
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140

eral.” A U.S. Attorney who intended to charge a defendant with a
capital offense was directed to prepare a “Death Penalty Evaluation”
form and prosecution memorandum to be reviewed by a committee
141
at Main Justice.
These procedures were established to “promote
consistency and fairness” in the administration of the federal death
142
penalty.
The Capital Case Review Committee at Main Justice was charged
with considering “all information presented to it, including any evidence of racial bias against the defendant or evidence that the Department has engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimina143
To the
tion in the administration of the federal death penalty.”
extent feasible, submissions received from the local prosecutor were
required to be devoid of information that could potentially identify
144
the races of either defendants or victims.
Defendants whose cases
were being considered were not limited in what sort of information
they could submit to the Committee, and the Protocol required that
defense counsel “be provided an opportunity to present to the Committee, orally or in writing, the reasons why the death penalty should
145
not be sought.” After considering all of the information submitted,
the Committee would make a recommendation to the Attorney General, who would make the ultimate decision whether to file a notice
146
of intention to seek the death penalty, pursuant to the new FDPA
147
procedures.
In determining whether the government should seek the death
penalty, all relevant parties in the Department were directed to perform the same function that a capital jury would ultimately be asked
to perform, namely determining “whether the statutory aggravating
factors applicable to the offense and any non-statutory aggravating
factors sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors applicable to the
offense to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence of any mitigating factors, whether the aggravating factors themselves are suffi148
cient to justify a sentence of death.” The weighing of factors was to
be “qualitative, not quantitative,” and “any mitigating factor reasona-

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(A).
Id. § 9-10.000(C). The Department of Justice’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. is
known as “Main Justice.” Little, supra note 22, at 351 n.13.
1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(G).
Id. § 9-10.000(D).
Little, supra note 22, at 411–12 & n.348.
1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(D).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2006).
1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(G).
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bly raised by the evidence [would] be considered in the light most favorable to the defendant” due to the likelihood that little or no evidence of mitigating factors would be available at the time of the De149
partment’s review.
Most significant to this Article is the part of the Protocol requiring
the Department to evaluate whether a “substantial federal interest”
justified federal, rather than stateside, prosecution in cases where the
defendant could be prosecuted by either the Department of Justice
150
or by local officials. Among the factors to be considered were: (1)
the relative strength of the State’s interest in prosecution; (2) the extent to which the criminal activity reached beyond the boundaries of
a single local prosecutorial jurisdiction; and (3) the relative likeli151
hood of effective stateside prosecution. The Protocol explicitly directed that “[i]n states where the imposition of the death penalty is
not authorized by law the fact that the maximum federal penalty is
death is insufficient, standing alone, to show a more substantial inter152
est in federal prosecution.”
Accordingly, the Protocol recognized
that the federal death penalty could apply in a non-death penalty
state, but declared that the mere availability of the death penalty
should not dictate whether a case should be prosecuted federally.
Under the 1995 Protocol, Attorney General Reno considered
153
whether to bring capital charges against 588 defendants.
Authorization was granted for 159 defendants (27%), but only twelve (2%)
were to be tried in a federal district located in a non-death penalty
154
state. For three of those twelve defendants, the U.S. Attorney submitted a recommendation against seeking the death penalty, but
both the Review Committee and the Attorney General disagreed and
granted authorization despite the U.S. Attorney’s negative recom155
mendation.
However, under the 1995 Protocol, a U.S. Attorney
could avoid a contrary decision from the Attorney General by enter149
150
151
152
153
154

155

Id.
Id. § 9-10.000(F).
Id.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-200–T-203.
Id. Additionally, authorizations were granted for three defendants in Washington, D.C.
and thirteen defendants in Puerto Rico, both of which are non-death penalty jurisdictions.
Id. at T-332–T-335. Of the three defendants for whom Attorney General Reno required a
death penalty prosecution, two were indicted in the Southern District of Iowa and one
was indicted in the District of Vermont. After Reno made the decision to authorize the
death penalty in those cases, all three defendants engaged in plea bargaining with the
U.S. Attorney and pled guilty in exchange for life sentences. See infra notes 156–59 and
accompanying text.
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ing into a plea agreement with the defendant that would dispose of
156
the case even after the Attorney General had made her decision.
Indeed, due to the availability of plea bargaining under the 1995 Protocol, most of the federal capital cases authorized in non-death penalty states never went to trial. Out of twelve defendants, five pled
157
guilty in exchange for life sentences, and charges against five others
158
were dismissed. Only two defendants went to trial in non-death penalty states, and both were sentenced to life imprisonment after the
159
juries declined to return death verdicts.
Despite the fact that each of the Department’s attempts to obtain
a death sentence in a non-death penalty state under the 1995 Protocol had proven futile, members of Congress from non-death penalty
states realized that federal law could introduce capital punishment in
jurisdictions that had chosen to abolish it. In the 106th Congress,
Congressman William Delahunt of Massachusetts introduced the Innocence Protection Act of 2000—legislation that, in most circumstances, would have prohibited the Federal Government from seeking
160
the death penalty in a non-death penalty state. Though Congress156

157
158

159
160

See 1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, at § 9-10.000(I); see also Little, supra note 22, at 419
(“[A]lthough the protocols appear to seek to bring within the purview of Main Justice all
cases from all U.S. Attorneys’ offices across the country ‘in which the death penalty may
be sought,’ even if the U.S. Attorney does not wish to seek it, they do not prevent the U.S.
Attorney from unilaterally dispensing with the penalty by plea once the case is filed.”).
FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES ENDING IN A GUILTY PLEA 1–
22, http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/Guilty_Plea.pdf.
In four of the five cases, the district judge held that the prosecution could not seek the
death penalty for legal reasons. FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL
DEFENDANTS WHO WERE DISMISSED BY THE JUDGE FOR LEGAL REASONS 1–3,
http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/6-2-08%20Dismissals%20by%20Judge.pdf. In one
case, the government moved to dismiss the indictment after additional evidence was uncovered exculpating the defendant and inculpating two individuals who were charged
subsequently. FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL PROSECUTIONS WHO
WERE NOT FOUND GUILTY OF THE CAPITAL CHARGE OR WERE INNOCENT 2,
http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/6-2-08%20Acquittal%20Innocent.pdf.
FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES ENDING IN A LIFE SENTENCE
2–17, http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/Life_Sentences.pdf.
H.R. 4167, 106th Cong. § 401(a) (2000). The bill would have added a § 3599 to Title 18
of the United States Code:
“Sec. 3599. Accommodation of State interests; certification requirement
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Government shall not seek the death penalty in any case initially brought before a district court of the United States that sits in a State that does not prescribe, authorize, or permit the imposition of such penalty for the alleged conduct, except upon
the certification in writing of the Attorney General or the designee of the Attorney
General that—
(1) the State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over
the defendant with respect to the alleged conduct;
(2) the State has requested that the Federal Government assume jurisdiction; or

Oct. 2009]

POLITICS AND PROSECUTION

81

man Delahunt’s bill never made it out of committee, it was cosponsored by congressmen from all but two non-death penalty states.
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced a companion bill in
the Senate that contained a similar provision, and though it too enjoyed support from the representatives of other non-death penalty
161
Delahunt and
states, it also failed to make it out of committee.
162
Leahy tried again, unsuccessfully, in the 107th Congress.
In fact,
although Leahy’s bill made it out of committee in 2002, the language
limiting the reach of the federal death penalty was struck by the Sen163
ate Judiciary Committee before the bill reached the Senate floor.
There is little doubt that Delahunt and Leahy took a particular interest in this matter as a result of the Attorney General’s 1999 decision
164
to authorize capital prosecutions in both Massachusetts and Ver165
mont.
Attorney General Reno’s tenure at the Department of Justice
ended in January 2001 with the inauguration of President George W.
Bush. Bush appointed John Ashcroft, a staunchly conservative death
166
penalty proponent, to lead the Department of Justice. Shortly after
taking office, Ashcroft decided to revise the 1995 Protocol in order to
have “greater consistency in all aspects of the application of the fed167
eral death penalty.” Three changes were particularly significant regarding the operation of the federal death penalty in non-death penalty states: (1) all potential capital cases had to be submitted to Main
Justice, even if the U.S. Attorney did not intend to seek the death

161
162
163
164

165

166
167

(3) the offense charged is an offense described in section 32, 229, 351, 794,
1091, 1114, 1118, 1203, 1751, 1992, 2340A, or 2381, or chapter 113B.
(b) STATE DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘State’ means each of the several
States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States.”
Innocence Protection Act of 2000, S. 2690, 106th Cong. § 401(a) (2000).
Innocence Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 912, 107th Cong. (2001); Innocence Protection
Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Cong. (2001).
S. 486, 107th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 16, 2002).
See Shelley Murphy & B.J. Roche, Former Nurse May Face Death Penalty in Hospital Slayings,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 1999, at A1 (noting that it was the nurse’s “alleged cruelty and
cunning that persuaded US Attorney General Janet Reno to recommend a death sentence for the first time in a federal case in Massachusetts”).
See Thomas Farragher, Vt. Debates Life-or-Death Row Matter, BOSTON GLOBE, at B1 (“Thirtyfour years after Vermont banned capital punishment, the federal government announced
last month that it would seek the death penalty against [a defendant in a pipe-bombing
trial].”).
See Nick Anderson, Conservative Ashcroft Respected in Senate, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000,
at 27 (noting that Ashcroft “ardently supports” the death penalty).
Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System, supra note 6, at 16
(statement of Larry Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States).
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168

penalty; (2) U.S. Attorneys were stripped of the ability to dispose of
potentially capital cases by plea bargain without approval from the At169
torney General; and (3) the section of the Protocol stating that the
absence of a stateside death penalty would not, by itself, justify a fed170
eral capital prosecution was stricken. In fact, the new Protocol declared that “[t]he decision whether there is a more substantial interest in Federal, as opposed to State, prosecution of the offense may
take into account any factor that reasonably bears on the relative interests of the State and Federal Government” and noted that the
“relative likelihood of . . . appropriate punishment upon conviction in
171
the State and Federal jurisdictions should be considered.”
When the Protocol was amended six years later by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, the Department was even more explicit in its
abandonment of the 1995 guidance against considering the nonavailability of a stateside death penalty during the review process. At
the outset, the new Protocol explained that each decision to seek or
not to seek the death penalty “must be based upon the facts and law
applicable to the case and be set within a framework of consistent and even172
handed national application of Federal capital sentencing laws,” and all
determinations were to be made with an eye towards “national consistency”:
National consistency requires treating similar cases similarly, when the
only material difference is the location of the crime. Reviewers in each
district are understandably most familiar with local norms or practice in
their district and State, but reviewers must also take care to contextualize
a given case within national norms or practice. For this reason, the multitier process used to make determinations . . . is carefully designed to pro-

168

169

170
171
172

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-10.040 (2001), available at
http://www.capdefnet.org/htm_library/protocols_new.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009)
[hereinafter 2001 DOJ Protocol] (requiring submissions “[i]n all cases in which the United States Attorney intends to recommend filing a notice of intention to seek the death
penalty” and also “[i]n every case in which a United States Attorney has obtained an indictment charging an offense that is punishable by death or conduct that could be
charged as an offense punishable by death, but in which the United States Attorney does
not intend to request authorization to seek the death penalty”).
Id. § 9-10.100 (“Once the Attorney General has authorized the United States Attorney to
seek the death penalty, the United States Attorney may not enter into a plea agreement
that requires withdrawal of the notice of intention to seek the death penalty without the
prior approval of the Attorney General.”).
See id. § 9-10.070; cf. 1995 DOJ Protocol, supra note 138, § 9-10.000(F).
2001 DOJ Protocol, supra note 168, § 9-10.070 (emphases added).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-10.030 (2007) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/
10mcrm.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) [hereinafter 2007 DOJ Protocol].
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vide reviewers with access to the national decision-making context, and
173
thereby, to reduce disparities across districts.

Furthermore, in December 2007, the Department told Congress that
the goal of its death penalty review and decision-making process was
“nationwide consistency in the fair and even-handed application of
federal capital sentencing laws in appropriate cases, irrespective of geog174
raphy or local predisposition for or against the death penalty.”
The emphasis on nationwide consistency marked a significant
change in the guiding tenets of the Department’s review process. Attorney General Reno accepted the possibility of incongruous application of the federal death penalty when she forbade capital prosecutions in non-death penalty states merely because the death penalty
would not have been available under state law. Even during Attorney
General Ashcroft’s tenure, the Department declared that “geographic
175
‘disparities’ are neither avoidable nor undesirable.”
In fact, the
Department stated that regional and local considerations should be
considered by U.S. Attorneys, even if uniformity would suffer:
There is nothing illegitimate about a district focusing on the actual needs
of the geographic area for which it is responsible in decisions about the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. Rather, a U.S. Attorney who failed to do
so would be derelict in his or her basic responsibilities. To the extent
that this results in varying numbers of federal capital cases among the
districts, it is no different than, nor any more objectionable than, the
‘disparities’ among the districts which occur equally in non-capital cas176
es.

Nonetheless, the cumulative effect of Ashcroft and Gonzales’s
changes to the Protocol was to increase the number of cases being
submitted to Main Justice for review, further concentrate decisionmaking power in Washington, and reverse the Department’s policy of
general deference to non-death penalty states. As the 2001 revision
also made clear, United States Attorneys could no longer expect deference with regard to their recommendations to seek or to not seek
the death penalty; the official commentary to the amended Protocol
noted that “[t]he Attorney General will, of course, retain legal authority as head of the Justice Department to determine . . . that the

173
174

175
176

Id. § 9-10.130 (emphasis added).
Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Senator Russell D. Feingold, Chairman, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
15–16 (December 17, 2007) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9.
Id.

84

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:1

death penalty is an appropriate punishment, notwithstanding the
177
United States Attorney’s view that it should not be pursued.”
As a consequence of the new protocols, the rate of disagreement
between the Attorney General and the U.S. Attorneys swelled. In 562
cases out of 588, Attorney General Reno either agreed with the U.S.
Attorney’s recommendation not to seek the death penalty or independently declined to grant authorization to seek the death penalty,
thereby requiring a capital prosecution for only twenty-six defendants
178
(4.4%). As the following table demonstrates, that rate of disagreement was significantly higher under Attorneys General Ashcroft and
Gonzales in four of the six years following implementation of the
179
2001 Protocol :

Year(s)

Attorney
General

Total
Defendants

Capital
Prosecution
Required

Disagreement
Rate

1995–
2000

Reno

588

26

4.4%

2001

Ashcroft

183

15

8.2%

2002

Ashcroft

201

17

8.5%

2003

Ashcroft

181

13

7.2%

2004

Ashcroft

210

4

1.9%

2005

Gonzales

191

3

1.6%

2006

Gonzales

274

21

7.7%

2001–
2006

Ashcroft/
Gonzales

1240

73

5.9%

Despite the fact that 2004 and 2005 were outlier years in which
180
“the number of ‘overrule’ decisions were unusually low,” the aver177
178
179

180

Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-200–T-203, T-332–T-335.
Official data for the Ashcroft, Gonzales, and Mukasey years have not yet been publicly
released. The numbers above for 2001 through 2006 were provided in the Department’s
responses to certain Congressional oversight questions two years ago. See Oversight of the
Federal Death Penalty: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 50–51 (2007) [hereinafter Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty] (Department
of Justice responses to pre-hearing questions); see also Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski,
supra note 174, at 8–9, 54–56.
Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, supra note 174, at 22–23. The Department did not
offer any explanation for why the number of overrules was “unusually low” in 2004 and
2005, but it suggested that these statistics may be “misleading if not viewed in context.”
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age disagreement rate during the six years that the Department of
Justice was led by Attorneys General Ashcroft and Gonzales was
33.1% higher than that during the six post-FDPA years that the Department was led by Attorney General Reno.
Furthermore, the number of federal capital prosecutions in nondeath penalty states more than doubled under the 2001 Protocol. In
the six years that the 1995 Protocol was in effect, Attorney General
Reno authorized twelve capital prosecutions in non-death penalty
181
states. In the six years between 2001 and 2006, the Department of
Justice sought the death penalty for twenty-six defendants in non182
death penalty states—an increase of 117%.
However, under the
2001 Protocol, U.S. Attorneys in non-death penalty states were no
longer able to dispose of any of those twenty-six cases through plea
bargaining the way that their predecessors had disposed of nearly half
183
of the pre-2001 caseload. Accordingly, more of these cases went to
184
trial, and death sentences were returned for eight defendants.
185
When the first defendant of the eight was sentenced in 2002, it became possible—for the first time since Anthony Chebatoris’s 1938
hanging—that a defendant convicted of a crime in a non-death penalty state would be executed by the federal government.
V. COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO FEDERAL INTRUSION
The federal government’s introduction of the death penalty into
non-death penalty jurisdictions and the Department of Justice’s explicit disregard for local opposition to capital punishment have provoked significant resentment in non-death penalty jurisdictions. With
the exception of Massachusetts and New York where the death pen186
alty was struck down by the courts, every other non-death penalty

181
182
183
184
185
186

The number of overrules in 2004 may have been impacted by Attorney General Ashcroft
having to relinquish his duties for most of March 2004 due to illness, and the numbers in
2005 may have been affected by the transition of power from Attorney General Ashcroft
to Attorney General Gonzales in February of that year. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Attorney General John Ashcroft Resumes Duties (Mar. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/March/04_ag_201.htm; Media Advisory, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales to Begin First Day at Department
of Justice (Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/
February/05_ag_044.htm.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at T-200–T-203.
See Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, supra note 174, at 20.
See 2001 DOJ Protocol, supra note 168, § 9-10.100.
See Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, supra note 174, at 20.
See White, supra note 38 (describing the sentencing of Marvin Gabrion).
See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); People v. LaValle, 817
N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).
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jurisdiction in the United States has affirmatively declared itself a
death penalty-free zone. However, the federalization of capital punishment and the supremacy of federal law make it impossible to stop
capital prosecutions in non-death penalty states; the most that the
states can do is force the federal government to transfer condemned
187
defendants to a death penalty state for execution.
The prevalence of capital punishment in the United States is
strongly correlated with geography. For the most part, the death penalty is a regional phenomenon. The two multi-district federal circuits in which the death penalty is most common are the Fifth Circuit
and the Eleventh Circuit, both of which are located in the south188
east. The six states that make up the two circuits—Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas—have collectively executed 633 people since 1976, thereby accounting for more than half
189
of the executions nationwide in the post-Furman era.
Each of the
187

18 U.S.C. § 3596(a) (2006) (“When the sentence is to be implemented, the Attorney
General shall release the person sentenced to death to the custody of a United States
marshal, who shall supervise implementation of the sentence in the manner prescribed
by the law of the State in which the sentence is imposed. If the law of the State does not
provide for implementation of a sentence of death, the court shall designate another
State, the law of which does provide for the implementation of a sentence of death, and
the sentence shall be implemented in the latter State in the manner prescribed by such
law.”). Courts have recognized that § 3596 “does not set forth specific factors for a court
to consider in designating a state for the implementation of a death sentence.” See, e.g.,
United States v. Fell, No. 2:01-CR-12-1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40578, at *5 (D. Vt. June 16,
2006). However, in coming to the conclusion that New York would be the most appropriate venue for defendant Fell’s execution with Indiana as the second-most appropriate
venue, the Fell court relied on considerations expressed in an earlier decision from the
District in Massachusetts in which New Hampshire was designated as the state of execution. See United States v. Sampson, 300 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D. Mass. 2004). In both cases,
the Federal Government had requested that Indiana be selected as the execution state
because the Bureau of Prisons has established a death row at the U.S. Penitentiary in
Terre Haute. However, though the Attorney General may imprison convicts at whatever
facility he or she chooses, § 3596 leaves it to the court to decide where the execution shall
take place. See Sampson, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 280. The prevailing considerations in Sampson
and Fell were: (1) the interest in ensuring that to the extent possible, all litigation relating to the defendant be consolidated in a single circuit; (2) the closeness of the connection of the designated state to the defendant’s crimes; and (3) the convenience and accessibility of the designated state for counsel, friends and family of both the defendant
and the defendant’s victims, and the media. Id. at 281–82. Furthermore, in rejecting the
Government’s request to order that defendant Sampson’s execution take place in Terre
Haute, the court considered that “the execution of a human being by the state is perhaps
the most solemn and significant act a government can perform” and, therefore, “should
not be reduced to an invisible, bureaucratic function” in “the remote Midwest.” Id. at
280, 283.

188

See U.S. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts
of Appeals and United States District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/images/
CircuitMap.pdf.

189

DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 12, at 3.
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six states authorizes the death penalty. On the other hand, the two
multi-district federal circuits in which capital punishment is least prevalent are the First and Second Circuits, both of which are located in
the northeast. The seven states that make up those two circuits—
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, and Vermont—have collectively executed one person
190
since 1976. Among the States in the First and Second Circuits, only
Connecticut and New Hampshire authorize the death penalty. However, as of last summer, there were almost as many federal capital cases pending in the Eastern District of New York alone as there were in
the eighteen federal districts of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits com191
bined.
This imbalance has not escaped notice in the non-death penalty
jurisdictions that have been seemingly targeted by the Department of
Justice. New York is such a jurisdiction. Since 1988, the federal prosecutors have pursued nearly two dozen capital cases in New York but
192
In one year alone, Attorney
obtained only one death sentence.
General Ashcroft ordered the U.S. Attorneys in Manhattan and
Brooklyn to pursue the death penalty in ten cases in which the U.S.
193
Attorneys had recommended against seeking death.
The forcefulness with which the Department of Justice has pursued the death penalty in New York has recently led some federal
judges to be uncharacteristically vocal about the Department’s actions. Last year, Judge Jack Weinstein told a federal prosecutor that
the prosecutor’s chances of convincing a jury to order a death sen194
tence were “virtually nil.”
Judge Weinstein’s comments echoed
those made roughly eleven months prior by Judge Frederic Block,
who told federal prosecutors to “kindly advise Washington
that . . . there is no chance in the world there would be a death pen-

190
191

192

193
194

Id.; see also Brigham, supra note 16, at 218 (“[New England] is decidedly less death-prone
than the nation as a whole.”).
FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNSEL, FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES PENDING TRIAL,
http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf_library/6-2-08%20Pending%20Trial.pdf (listing six cases
pending in the Eastern District of New York and eight cases pending in Florida, Louisiana, and Texas as of June 2, 2008).
See Alan Feuer, An Aversion to the Death Penalty, But No Shortage of Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2008, at B1 (nothing that “[i]n the 20 years since the federal death penalty statute was
revived, no federal juries have been more reluctant to sentence federal defendants to
death than those in New York”).
Id.
United States v. Taveras, No. 04-156 (JBW), 2008 WL 565495, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 29,
2008).
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alty verdict” in the case then-pending before him. Shortly thereafter, a Brooklyn jury returned the first federal death sentence in New
196
York in more than fifty years, but Judge Block cautioned that the
Department’s lone success should not encourage federal prosecutors
to bring more capital cases:
In convicting Mr. Wilson and rejecting the death penalty in all of the
other 16 death penalty cases, New Yorkers have sent a clear signal to the
attorney general: He should be more circumspect and realistic in authorizing death penalty prosecutions, lest the judicial system be overwhelmed, the community’s will ignored and taxpayer dollars improvi197
dently spent.

Expense was also a concern articulated by Judge Weinstein, who
estimated that the capital case currently before him has already cost
both parties more than $1.5 million and would probably cost twice
198
that should the case proceed to trial. Judge Block also noted that
the social cost of funneling money into capital prosecutions where
success is unlikely is potentially great: “[A] death penalty prosecution
depletes the resources of the prosecutor’s office, making it more difficult to attend to the backlog of cases that don’t involve the death
199
penalty.”
Three other Brooklyn judges have also criticized the federal government’s push for capital verdicts in New York. Judge Nicholas Garaufis has asked the Justice Department to reconsider its authoriza200
In
tions to seek the death penalty in at least two different cases.
another case, after a jury convicted a defendant of capital charges but
before it began the penalty phase, Chief Judge Raymond Dearie
201
asked prosecutors to reassess their request for the death penalty.
Finally, Judge John Gleeson has decried the Department’s attempt to
“iron out” regional differences as “a bad idea,” prophesying that “it
will be a long time before Georgia becomes just like Vermont, or New
202
York City just like Houston.”
Uneasiness with the Department of Justice’s incursions into abolitionist enclaves has not been limited to the bench. In 2003, a defense
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

William K. Rashbaum, Judge Urges U.S. to Drop Plan to Seek Death Penalty in Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2007, at B2.
Michael Brick, Jury Agrees on Death Sentence for the Killer of Two Detectives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2007, at A1.
Frederic Block, Op-Ed., A Slow Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at A27.
Taveras, 2008 WL 565495, at *1.
Block, supra note 197.
Feuer, supra note 192.
Joseph Goldstein, Judges Revolt over Death Penalty, N.Y. SUN, Mar. 4, 2008,
http://www2.nysun.com/article/72219.
Gleeson, supra note 49, at 1728.
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attorney successfully convinced a Brooklyn jury not to impose a death
sentence on a gang leader convicted of multiple murders by emphasizing the role that Attorney General Ashcroft personally played in
requiring prosecutors to seek the death penalty over the objections of
203
the U.S. Attorney and the Review Committee. At the beginning of
the penalty phase, defense attorney Richard Levitt told the jury that
204
“John Ashcroft is asking you to kill Emile Dixon,” and in his closing,
Levitt reminded the jury that Dixon’s “death penalty prosecution was
ordered by John Ashcroft, that’s who it was ordered by. He’s not your
boss or conscious [sic]. . . . [Y]ou don’t have to listen to John Ash205
croft.”
Prosecutors too have had qualms about the Department’s death
penalty initiative in non-death penalty states, but expressing such
concerns to the Department has proven to be an occupational hazard. Of the nine U.S. Attorneys dismissed by the Bush administration
206
in 2006, three of them quarreled with Main Justice over the admini207
stration of the federal death penalty. One of the fired prosecutors,
Margaret Chiara, was the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of
Michigan—a federal district in the longest-standing non-death pen208
alty state. In 2003, Chiara flew to Washington in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Attorney General Ashcroft not to authorize the
death penalty against two defendants, and she was publicly outspoken
209
about her opposition to capital punishment.
Defending Chiara’s
dismissal, the Department of Justice said that she was fired because it
had “no assurance that DOJ priorities/policies [were] being carried

203

204
205
206

207

208

209

William Glaberson, Jury Rejects Death Penalty in 2 Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at B1
(noting that, in Dixon’s case, Attorney General Ashcroft “overruled the federal prosecutors to direct that they seek execution”).
Transcript of Capital Hearing at 3420, United States v. Dixon, No. CR-01-389 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 19, 2003).
Id. at 3970.
See David Johnston & Eric Lipton, ‘Loyalty’ to Bush and Gonzales Was Factor in Prosecutors’
Firings, E-Mail Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A18. For more information about the
allegedly politicized firings of U.S. Attorneys, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L. RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
REMOVAL
OF
NINE
U.S.
ATTORNEYS
IN
2006
(2008),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf.
Richard A. Serrano et al., At Justice, Life-and-Death Frictions: Fired U.S. Attorneys in California, Michigan and Arizona Shared a Reluctance to Pursue Capital Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2007, at 10.
See Peter Slevin, Eyebrows are Raised in Mich. over Reasons for Prosecutor’s Firing, WASH. POST.,
Mar. 25, 2007, at A04 (“Some defense lawyers speculate that Chiara, who once trained to
be a nun, fell out of favor with the Bush administration over her personal opposition to
the death penalty.”).
Serrano et al., supra note 207.
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210

out” under her leadership —an ambiguous statement that may well
have referred to Main Justice’s sense that Chiara could not be trusted
to assist with the Administration’s project of federalizing the death
211
penalty.
Less ambiguous was the joint report of the Department of Justice’s
Inspector General and the Office of Professional Responsibility,
which concluded that “the most significant factor in [U.S. Attorney
for the District of Arizona Paul] Charlton’s removal was his actions in
212
Though Arizona is a death penalty state,
a death penalty case.”
Charlton “persistently opposed the Department’s decision to seek the
death penalty in a homicide case, and he irritated Department leaders by seeking a meeting with the Attorney General” in an attempt to
get Attorney General Gonzales to reverse his decision to authorize a
213
capital prosecution.
The report details Charlton’s contacts with
numerous officials at Main Justice and the consequent email traffic
among those officials by whom Charlton was described as “disrespectful to the Attorney General.” In that email traffic, a counselor in the
Deputy Attorney General’s office wrote that she found “it very difficult to believe that [Charlton] was doing anything but trying to cir214
cumvent the AG’s [decision to authorize the death penalty].” With210

211

212
213
214

Id. See also Johnston & Lipton, supra note 206 (noting that, in a document sent from the
Department of Justice to White House Counsel Harriet Miers ranking federal prosecutors, Chiara was listed as someone who “chafed against administration initiatives”). Several months later, during the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearings on Michael Mukasey’s nomination to become Attorney General, Congress probed the connection
between the U.S. Attorney firings and the administration of the federal death penalty. In
response to a question from Senator Russell Feingold, an outspoken critic of the administration of the federal death penalty, Mukasey indicated his support for geographic uniformity, noting that “the system that was created in the Department is supposed to treat
[defendants] the same way” without regard to whether a particular jurisdiction is “more
accustomed to or inured to or favorable to the death penalty.” Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of Michael B. Mukasey to be Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 173–74 (2007).
See Liliana Segura, Attorney General, Capital Punishment, NATION, Mar. 29, 2007,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070409/segura (“Both Paul Charlton of Arizona and
Margaret Chiara of Michigan have been criticized for failing to seek death sentences with
significant gusto. Both US Attorneys were pressured to participate in an aggressive campaign begun by former Attorney General John Ashcroft and continued by Gonzales to extend the federal death penalty—particularly into jurisdictions without death-penalty statutes of their own.”).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 206, at 335.
Id.
Id. at 230–31. These comments and accusations were the result of Charlton’s decision to
ask the district court to extend the time to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty
even after Attorney General Gonzales signed the notice and delivered it to Charlton. According to the report, this situation prompted a change in the wording of the Attorney
General’s missives to U.S. Attorneys in death penalty cases, which now states, “You are au-
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in a month of Charlton’s failed attempt to meet with Gonzales, Gonzales’s Chief of Staff Kyle Sampson added Charlton’s name to a list
entitled “USAs We Now Should Consider Pushing Out,” and Charlton
215
was ordered to resign fewer than three months thereafter.
The
Charlton episode is significant because it further demonstrates how
the Department of Justice under Attorney General Gonzales zealously
216
pursued federal capital prosecutions.
Perhaps the most significant response to the Department’s imposition of the federal death penalty in a non-death penalty jurisdiction
has been seen in Puerto Rico. Testifying before Congress in 2007,
Roberto Sánchez Ramos, the Puerto Rican Secretary of Justice, stated
that “the Puerto Rican people strongly disagree with the use of death
217
as a form of punishment.” That disagreement, he said, is grounded
in “the religious convictions of the majority of Puerto Ricans, their
strict adherence to the guarantee of the equal protection of the law,
the grounding of [Puerto Rico’s] legal system on the principles of a
continental European model which has moved away from the death
penalty, [and] a very particular understanding of the powers that may
218
be safely, wisely, legitimately and justly ascribed to the State.” Puerto Rico’s deep-seated opposition to capital punishment is reflected in
its Constitution, which declares bluntly that “[t]he death penalty shall
219
not exist.”
Nonetheless, Puerto Rico has been a virtual repository
for the Department of Justice’s capital prosecution efforts and once
had the greatest number of pending death penalty cases in the entire
220
federal system. However, Puerto Ricans did not believe that statistic
to be worth bragging about, noting instead that:

215
216

217

218
219
220

thorized and directed to seek the death penalty.” Id. at 233 n.150 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Id. at 220.
Further evidence of the Department’s attitude towards the federal death penalty can be
found in a March 15, 2004 email from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bradley
Schlozman to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Wan Kim discussing the hiring of attorneys for the Civil Rights Division in which Schlozman wrote that “any candidate must profess his/her willingness to zealously prosecute both death penalty and [partial-birth abortion] cases.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L.
RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER
IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 24 (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf.
Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty, supra note 179, at 303 (testimony of Roberto J. Sánchez Ramos, Sec’y of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, on behalf of Aníbal Acevedo
Vilá, Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico).
Id.
P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7.
See Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty, supra note 179, at 313–14; see also United States v.
Acosta Martinez (Acosta Martinez I), 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 311 & n.1 (D.P.R. 2000) (“The
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The pursuit of the federal death penalty in Puerto Rico stands against the
highest social, cultural, political, moral and religious values of the members of our community, and violates the balance of power and comity
that the people of Puerto Rico envision as transcendental to their rela221
tionship with the United States.

In 2000, a federal district court judge held that FDPA did not apply in Puerto Rico because the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act
mandated that federal laws that were “locally inapplicable” would not
222
affect the commonwealth.
The judge cited the Commonwealth
Constitution and declared the imposition of capital punishment for
“crimes committed wholly within the boundaries of the Commonwealth” to be “unconscionable and against the most basic notion of
223
justice.”
Accordingly, the judge struck the death penalty certification in the case and ordered the Department of Justice to proceed
224
with the prosecution “as an ordinary felony case.”
However, less than a year later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
225
reversed the district court. The court concluded that “[t]he death
penalty is intended to apply to Puerto Rico [sic] federal defendants
just as it applies to such defendants in the various states,” and that,
reflecting the supremacy of federal law, Acts of Congress “trump”
226
provisions in state and commonwealth constitutions. Furthermore,
the court said that, notwithstanding “Puerto Rico’s interest and its
moral and cultural sentiment against the death penalty,” Congress
227
“retains federal power over federal crimes.”

221
222

223
224
225
226
227

Puerto Rico U.S. Attorney’s Office has submitted the largest number of potential death
penalty cases (59) of any of the 94 federal districts since the Capital Case Review protocol
was issued in 1995.”).
Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty, supra note 179, at 314.
48 U.S.C. § 734 (1994) (“The statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable . . . shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 321–27. For
more information on the locally inapplicable standard, see Elizabeth Vincens, Application
of the Federal Death Penalty Act to Puerto Rico: A New Test for the Locally Inapplicable Standard,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 350 (2005).
Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 327.
Id.
See United States v. Acosta-Martinez (Acosta Martinez II), 252 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19–20. Federal courts in non-death penalty states have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. O’Reilly, No. 05-80025, 2007 WL 2421378, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 23, 2007) (“While Michigan is free to prohibit the death penalty for statecharged crimes, this federal Court cannot prohibit imposition of the death penalty when
authorized by federal law for federally-charged crimes . . . .”); United States v. Tuck
Chong, 123 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (D. Haw. 1999) (“The federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute Defendant, charged with a crime against the United States, in federal
court. Moreover, the federal government has jurisdiction to determine the appropriate
sentence under federal law.”).
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After the First Circuit’s ruling, Attorney General Ashcroft proceeded with the capital cases against Acosta Martinez and his codefendant. On July 31, 2003, both men were acquitted of capital
228
murder and cleared of all charges. Commentators believed that the
acquittals were designed to show Washington that the Federal Government would not succeed in exporting the death penalty to Puerto
229
Rico.
Responding to the verdict, Secretary Sánchez Ramos cautioned, “when the federal government seeks death in jurisdictions
such as Puerto Rico, it disregards the possibility of jury nullification at
230
its own risk . . . and at the risk of future potential victims of crime.”
Federalization of the death penalty has also engendered hostility
in other non-death penalty jurisdictions. In 2003, after federal prosecutors secured a death sentence against Gary Lee Sampson in Massachusetts, the chairman of Massachusetts Citizens Against the Death
Penalty credited the trial with increasing his organization’s member231
ship. In 2005, after a federal jury in Burlington, Vermont convicted
Donald Fell of a fatal carjacking, the local mayor called the federal
death penalty “an affront to state’s [sic] rights[,] . . . not consistent
232
with the values of a majority of Vermonters.”
The mayor also singled out the former Attorney General for blame: “Many of us resent

228
229
230

231
232

Abby Goodnough, Acquittal in Puerto Rico Averts Fight over Government’s Right to Seek Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A14.
Leonard Post, Puerto Rican Prosecutors Weigh Retrial; Acquittals Ended a Fight over the Death
Penalty, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 11, 2003, at 4.
Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty, supra note 179, at 311. This phenomenon mirrors
that seen in the United States before juries were permitted to return non-death verdicts
in capital cases. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. Using an acquittal in a
capital case as a means of sending a message to the prosecutors is nothing new; as the Supreme Court observed in 1976, “[a]merican jurors have, with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict” since the late 1700s. Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).
Dade, supra note 34 (“What we’ve seen is that this case has really drawn people toward the
abolition movement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Lynne Tuohy, Federal Case Riles Many in Vermont; Death Penalty Quest ‘Wildly Unpopular’,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 4, 2005, at A1. But see Katie Zezima, In Rare Case, Vermont Jury
Backs Death for a Killer, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2005, at A10 (quoting late Vermont Law
School professor Michael Mello as explaining that “[t]he people of Vermont are much
more ambivalent about the death penalty than our elites, our chattering classes”). However, questioning “the appropriateness of a federal court or jury even considering local
values,” Judge Reena Raggi, writing on behalf of six judges on the Second Circuit, recently rejected the proposition that the Constitution requires “a special solicitude for local values.” See United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2009) (Raggi, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (suggesting that deference to “local values”
would “appropriately be rejected out of hand if the local ‘value’ . . . were opposition to
the sorts of civil rights, environmental, or gun trafficking requirements that are enforced
through federal criminal law in ways not always mirrored in state legislation”).
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the imposition of a death penalty as an option in this state by John
233
And two years ago,
Ashcroft and his friends from Washington.”
when Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr. was sentenced to death by a federal jury
in North Dakota, even the prosecuting U.S. Attorney observed that
the death penalty is “just not part of the culture up here really at
234
all.”
VI. WHAT’S NEXT: A NEW EXECUTIVE, BUT THE SAME EXECUTIONS?
Though the Department of Justice has yet to release fresh data
that would permit us to analyze the decisions made by Attorney General Mukasey with regard to federal capital prosecutions in non-death
235
penalty states, we doubt that there was any significant departure
236
However, it is
from the precedent set by Mukasey’s predecessors.
conceivable that a shift—perhaps even a major shift—will result from
President Barack Obama’s appointment of Eric Holder, a prominent
opponent of capital punishment, as Attorney General. Insofar as
237
Holder, who was Deputy Attorney General under Janet Reno, has
experience with the 1995 procedures to which various political and
238
legal organizations are advocating a return, a repeal of the 2001
and 2005 protocols is entirely possible.

233

234
235

236

237
238

Tuohy, supra note 232; see also Fell, 571 F.3d at 286 (Calabresi, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (describing Attorney General Ashcroft’s rejection of a plea agreement whereby Fell would have pled guilty in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment and arguing that “the draft plea agreement reflected the judgments of Vermontbased law enforcement enforcers on what was appropriate locally, and its overruling by
Main Justice reflected a centralist, and in this case decidedly anti-federalist, decision”).
Libby Sander, Judge Imposes Death in Killing of North Dakota Student, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2007, at A15.
During his confirmation hearing, Attorney General-nominee Eric Holder discussed his
involvement in preparing the Justice Department’s 2000 survey of the federal death penalty, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at which time Holder told Senator Russ Feingold that “[i]t might be . . . an appropriate time to do another study and then share the
results, as we did, in that first—in that first study.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of Eric H. Holder to be Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 67 (2009).
See Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through Osmosis—Reminders to Encourage a
Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 87 n.104 (2008) (noting that neither “former Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales nor his successor Michael B. Mukasey” rescinded policies promulgated by Attorney General John Ashcroft designed to reduce sentencing disparities).
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/meetag.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
See, e.g., 2009 CRIM. JUST. TRANSITION COAL., SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
NEXT
ADMINISTRATION
AND
CONGRESS
164–65
(2008),
THE
http://2009transition.org/criminaljustice.
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A number of interest groups have seized upon Attorney General
Holder’s appointment as an opportunity to push for change. Among
the organizations pushing for the repudiation of the Bush administration’s death penalty procedures is the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (“LDF”), which, as part of the 2009 Criminal Justice Transition Coalition, has proposed a dozen ways to reform the
239
federal death penalty.
The LDF’s recommendations observe that
the uptick in federal capital prosecutions over the past eight years was
the result of “the U.S. Attorney General’s affirmative agenda to seek
capital sentences, often in direct contravention of local U.S. Attor240
neys’ own recommendations not to seek the death penalty.”
The
“overcentralization of the federal death penalty’s decision-making
process” is described as “cumbersome, slow, and extremely costly”
and is blamed for “more frequent federal capital prosecutions in ju241
risdictions that have abolished the death penalty under state law.”
Accordingly, the LDF has recommended that the Department of Justice strip out from the death penalty protocols those provisions that
permit Main Justice to review death-eligible cases even where the U.S.
242
Attorney has not requested permission to seek the death penalty.
Similarly, a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York (“City Bar”) recommended that the Attorney General review only those death-eligible cases in which U.S. Attorneys request
243
authorization to seek the death penalty. In cases where such a request is made, review by Main Justice should be automatic and focus
on the facts of the individual case rather than on macro concerns
244
(such as geographic uniformity). According to the City Bar, capital
prosecutions should be authorized only where “a very substantial federal interest in pursuing the death penalty” exists, and prosecutors
239

240
241
242
243

244

During the 1960s, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund waged a successful
campaign to halt executions while the constitutionality of the death penalty was being
challenged in the federal courts. See BANNER, supra note 29, at 252; THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 45, at 184–85.
2009 CRIM. JUST. TRANSITION COAL., supra note 238, at 164.
Id.
Id. at 165; see 2001 DOJ PROTOCOL, supra note 168, § 9-10.040.
ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM. ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATEMENT TO
THE JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS TRANSITION TEAM REGARDING FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES 1
(2008), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Capital_Punishment_Transition_Memo.pdf.
Though the Statement is very interesting, it contains several significant errors. For example, the Statement credits “the first Bush Administration” with the 1995 Protocols even
though, as discussed above, the Protocols were instituted by President Clinton’s Attorney
General, Janet Reno, and it recommends that “the Obama Administration adopt those
protocols that were in effect prior to 1995” even though there were no federal death penalty protocols until 1995. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 243, at 1–2.
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should be permitted to engage in non-capital plea bargains without
245
approval from the Attorney General.
Unlike the LDF, the City Bar “urge[d] the Obama Administration
not to seek the death penalty in states which do not have death penalty laws,” except in cases involving “substantial federal issues,” such
246
as treason, terrorism, or the murder of a federal agent.
The City
Bar denounced the Bush administration’s attempt to achieve national
uniformity as “futile,” and declared that “[m]aking one region or
state just like every other region or state in criminal matters is not
necessarily desirable, especially where the death penalty is con247
cerned.”
Attorney General Holder has made several statements that suggest
he may not agree with the City Bar’s position on the undesirability of
uniformity. Most recently, during his confirmation hearing, Holder
said that the Department of Justice’s 2000 report on the death penalty “raised some very disturbing questions about not only the racial
identity of people who were in the death system—in the federal death
248
system, but also the geographic distribution of those people.” And
even before the 2000 report was published, Holder expressed support
for greater uniformity in the application of the death penalty:
Federal cases have to be judged on a nationwide standard. We have one
system, and it is appropriate for people in the federal system all to be
treated in the same way. And that’s one of the things that we try to
search for, especially when it comes to the death penalty. We look—we
strive for uniformity in the application of federal law and in the treat249
ment of people who are federal defendants.

Additionally, though Holder’s opposition to capital punishment is
well known, he has indicated that he would not allow his personal beliefs to interfere with his duty as the Justice Department’s highest official to administer the federal death penalty. For example, during
his first confirmation hearing in 1997, after Holder acknowledged
that he is “not a proponent of the death penalty,” he immediately assured the Senate Judiciary Committee that “even with those statutes

245
246

247
248
249

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2. The LDF alluded to the federalization of the death penalty in non-death penalty
states by noting that “overcentralization . . . has resulted in more frequent federal capital
prosecutions” during the past eight years, but, it did not target that concern specifically in
its recommendations. See 2009 CRIM. JUST. TRANSITION COAL., supra note 238, at 164.
ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 243, at 2.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Eric H. Holder to be Attorney General of the United
States, supra note 235, at 67.
Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States, Justice Department Weekly News
Conference (Feb. 10, 2000) (transcript available through CQ Transcriptions).
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that have death penalty provisions, they will be fully enforced.” The
fact that President Obama has endorsed capital punishment for certain heinous crimes, while at the same time leveling a number of criticisms at the manner in which the death penalty is implemented,
leaves us uncertain as to whether reform of the federal death penalty
251
will be a priority for the new administration.
Prosecutors, of course, have enormous discretion, and as discussed above the DOJ’s Guidelines with respect to seeking the death
penalty are intended to channel that discretion to a more uniform
application. While the possibility of a return to the 1995 procedures
may be welcomed by opponents of the death penalty and advocates
for more local control of such decision making, it does highlight just
one example of the way in which politics—and in particular which
party occupies the White House and the Office of the Attorney General—seems to be inextricably linked to the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Considered alongside other flip-flops over the past several
Administrations on how much discretion federal prosecutors should
have in determining which charges to bring, what kinds of plea deals
to offer, and how constrained such decision making should be by the
252
Sentencing Guidelines, the prospect of changes and reversals in
federal death penalty protocols raises the question of whether such
policies ought to be determined through some less political and/or
more bipartisan mechanism that might avoid as many significant
changes from administration to administration and thus reduce the
appearance (if not the reality) of a politicized Department of Jus253
tice.

250
251

252
253

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Eric H. Holder to be Deputy Attorney General of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 61 (1997).
See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 58 (2006) (“I believe there are some crimes—
mass murder, the rape and murder of a child—so heinous, so beyond the pale, that the
community is justified in expressing the full measure of its outrage by meting out the ultimate punishment.”); see also id. (describing capital cases in Illinois as “rife with error,
questionable police tactics, racial bias, and shoddy lawyering”); Christi Parsons, Ryan Vetoes Expanded Death Penalty, Governor Rejects Bill to Include Gang Slayings, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18,
2001, at 13 (quoting then-State Senator Obama as noting “a strong overlap between gang
affiliation and young men of color,” and opposing legislation that would have made gangrelated murder a capital offense because “it’s problematic for [young men of color] to be
singled out as more likely to receive the death penalty for carrying out certain acts than
are others who do the same thing”).
See SUBIN ET AL., supra note 56.
As former U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White testified before Congress, one of the reasons that
the politicized firings of U.S. Attorneys were so troubling was because they “undermine[d] the importance of the office of the United States Attorney, the independence of
the United States Attorneys, and the public’s sense of evenhanded and impartial justice.”
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VII. CONCLUSION
Since Congress resurrected the federal death penalty in 1988, the
Department of Justice has pursued capital cases in non-death penalty
states with increasing frequency, but the Department’s endeavor under former Attorneys General Ashcroft, Gonzales, and Mukasey to
expand the death penalty has proven relatively ineffective. Though
the Department has authorized capital prosecutions for nearly forty
defendants in non-death penalty states, only nine death sentences
have been imposed. Courts have upheld the Department’s actions as
being constitutionally permissible given the supremacy of federal law,
but the federal death penalty has been unwelcome and met with hostility in jurisdictions that have affirmatively abolished or otherwise refrained from enacting local capital sentencing laws. Citing concerns
of judicial economy and allocation of prosecutorial resources, federal
judges and even some federal prosecutors have argued that the Attorney General should defer to the U.S. Attorney’s assessment of
whether to pursue the death penalty in a particular case. Whether
Attorney General Holder will heed the recommendations of several
reformist organizations and herald a return to the death penalty protocols that were in place when he was Attorney General Reno’s deputy—protocols that vested substantially more discretion at the local
U.S. Attorney’s Office level—remains to be seen.
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